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LOST AND FOUND
Sonia Lawrence*
My reflections from the original symposium have been misplaced. They are inside a notebook I cannot
find. The videotape of the day has been taped over. I do not remember what I said, probably because I
have said too much in the interim. My thoughts, sentences, words, they happened, but they are lost.
When thinking about “Reigniting Critical Race” I think about my lost words. What does it mean to
say “CRT as a lens is absent within the contemporary law school curriculum” when it is not absent, but
unseen? I do not mean to suggest that anywhere in Canada, CRT infuses institutional approaches to
curriculum or is a primary theoretical position for large numbers of scholars. But when the
contemporary efforts to discuss CRT start from the premise that it is dead in curriculum, I confess to a
feeling I cannot quite describe. I am afraid it is pique, but perhaps it is not. I think we should examine
why we need to claim that the fire is dead. If we see a dead fire, what are we saying to those who write
in the area, those who assign the work of Esmerelda Thornhill, Patricia, Monture, Sherene Razack and
others? Was there a glorious past in which the flame burned brightly in the Canadian legal
academy? Was critical race once a modish theoretical approach? Was it a radical movement crushed
into conformity? I do not know whether any of these things are true, and like any student of law, I have
spent quite some time fighting with the question – puzzling over the premise for this symposium and the
vision that it creates of past and present. What are we struggling to regain, reignite, resurrect? What
have we lost? What would it be like to find it?
When I was in my last year of law school, almost two decades ago now, one of my professors said to
me, “While I was in Boston, I picked this up for you”. She handed me a copy of The Alchemy of Race
and Rights by Patricia Williams. She offered me a way in and a way out. In to the legal academy, the
idea that it was possible to feel torn and yet be inside, to inhabit the structure as a host as we clawed and
ate our way out, at least temporarily, out of the conviction that I was not quite right, was not good
enough, was not qualified. But what critical race theory has brought to Canadian legal scholarship,
Canadian law teaching and Canadian law is more complicated to assess. Many scholars have worked to
adapt the analytical techniques and substantive principles of CRT into the Canadian context. But we
cannot rely on critical race work done in the US, for three relatively obvious reasons: context, proof and
praxis.
First, the contexts are and have always been, divergent; historically, demographically,
legally. Critical race work in the US increasingly contends with two key “local” issues – the destruction
of constitutional protections under a doctrine of colourblindness, and the assertion that the election of
Obama is an indicator that the U.S. has become a post-racial society. These are critical issues. But they
have a muted resonance in Canada. Obviously, they matter here. The elephant is moving – we feel that.
Yet here in Canada we have a different context. Most significantly, perhaps, there is increased
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recognition of the significance of the relationship between Canada and First Nations, a relationship
which requires attention in Canadian critical race work (see, for instance, the work of Patricia Monture
and Sherene Razack). This different context has historical roots, and contemporary inflections. What
does colour blindness mean in Canada? How is it reflected in contemporary culture, or in substantive
law? Even if American critical race theory has developed beyond a black & white paradigm, it is not
enough to enable wholesale transplantation. We need indigenous critical race work, work that starts
from the contention that processes of racialization and racial subordination are enabled by law, and work
that seeks to illustrate these processes in our history and practice. We have some of that work. We will
always need more.
Second, and relatedly, critical race work which aims to produce legal results needs a form of
proof. Canadian law’s interest in equality is in most ways a comparative interest – an interest in
discrimination rather than, for instance, economic equality. Usually, in discrimination/equality claims,
that means a need for data which illustrates differential treatment. But the dearth of such data in
doctrinally useful forms will surprise many observers. Some of the most egregious forms of racial
inequality in this country will be extremely difficult to constitutionally challenge. The data do not exist,
and will be costly, and perhaps impossible to develop. This is in part about context. A different history
in Canada with respect to racial categories means different data collection practices. Refusal to
recognize race can make it harder to document racial discrimination. Even taking into account the
different timelines, Canada has a very slim body of race jurisprudence compared to the U.S. despite
having constitutional protections against racial discrimination since 1982. Where are the cases? Even
the existence of Human Rights codes, tribunals and commissions cannot fully explain why there are no
section 15 (equality) cases on race from the Supreme Court of Canada, with the exception of a few
recent cases which treat (I would say very wrongly) band membership as a racial categorization.
Finally, critical race is praxis. One of the key insights of critical race theory, building on critical
theory more generally, is the recognition of the definitional power contained not only in legal analysis
but of legal practice. Critical race action requires attention to communities of non scholars –
communities of racialized people with intimate knowledge of oppression and discrimination. These
communities must determine priorities, strategies, opportunities, not have these determined by legal
scholars and practitioners who have come up with a workable doctrinal argument. Crucially, critical
race praxis will require developing allies and coalitions, in terms of law and politics. These complicated
discussions require that local communities are heard. I do not mean to suggest that this is not being
done in Canada, but rather am pointing out one more reason that we are unable to rely on American
work. How will various racialized peoples participate in racial discrimination claims in the context of
immigration, of colonialism and indigenous rights, of policing? How are communities differently
situated and defined? How can we define the community of interest, and the conflicts between these
groups? In these struggles, we should recognize the uniqueness of our situation, and the need for local
debate, local participation and local solutions.
These differences between the U.S. and Canada are not intended to suggest that American work on
race offers us nothing. But it is intended to suggest that harking too often to the U.S. leads us into more
complications. As an example, when we treat Brown v. Board of Education as a touchstone, we may
imply that racial segregation in schools is in the past and that law vanquished it. American critical race
scholarship can help question some of those assumptions. But it cannot illustrate the historical
approaches to segregation in schooling in Canada (which differed considerably by location), nor the
contemporary realities of de facto segregation. When those of us in Canada consider where to put our
critical race energy, we can consider these three categories. We can ask where we are best suited to

Vol. 31(2)

Lost and Found

99

serve. We can ask what has gone before and what is available now. Then we can embrace the paradox
of finding comfort in a vision which pulls apart the tightly knit structures of legal power even though it
is those structures which constitute our specialised knowledge and expertise.

